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McMunigal: Prosecutors and Corrupt Science

PROSECUTORS AND CORRUPT SCIENCE
Kevin C. McMunigal*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Scientific evidence has made dramatic and well publicized
contributions to improving the factual accuracy of criminal convictions.
A 1996 Department of Justice study documented twenty-eight cases in
which DNA evidence revealed that innocent defendants had been
wrongly convicted, many serving substantial prison terms.' Over and
over in recent years, newspaper headlines have announced DNA
exonerations and wrongful convictions. The 2000 book, Actual
Innocence, details sixty-two of the Innocence Project's first DNA
exonerations of wrongfully convicted defendants. 2 The Innocence
Project's most recent data reveals 212 such exonerations.3 Other similar
projects from around the country tell the same sad stories. In these cases,
scientific evidence in the form of DNA has helped reveal the truth years
after a trial had produced an inaccurate conviction.
A sinister aspect of forensic science, though, has also come to light
in recent years. Ironically, scientific evidence in the form of DNA
testing has at times revealed that previous use of corrupt scientific
evidence at trial helped bring about a wrongful conviction. Indeed, later
valid DNA testing has in some cases revealed that prior corrupt DNA
testing helped send an innocent person to jail.4

*

Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I

want to thank my colleague, Professor Paul Giannelli, who started me thinking about the questions
raised in this Article.
1. EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL ii, 34 (1996).
2. JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BERRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED app. 2 (2000).

3. The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
4. See Jane Campbell Moriarty, "Misconvictions," Science, and the Ministers of Justice, 86
NEB. L. REV. 1, 5(2007).
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An investigation of Fred Zain, the former head serologist at the
West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory, for example, showed that
between 1979 and 1989, he falsified test results in as many as 134 cases,
almost always in favor of the prosecution. 5 In State v. Woodall, DNA
evidence showed in a post-conviction proceeding that Glen Dale
Woodall was innocent and led to an investigation of the blood tests by
Zain that had helped convict Woodall.6 The revelation of the falsity of
these tests in turn led to a wider investigation of Zain.7
Both scholars and journalists have tended to focus on the science
involved and the expert witnesses who bring it into the criminal
courtroom. This Article, by contrast, focuses on the less frequently
examined questions raised by the role prosecutors have played in this
abuse. How did they contribute to it? Why did they fail to correct it?
Why were the prosecutors who called Zain, for example, either
unwilling or unable to prevent corrupt scientific evidence from causing a
criminal case to end in an erroneous conviction?
II.

CARROLL V. STATE

A number of cases involving prosecutorial misuse of scientific
evidence have achieved substantial notoriety. Professor Paul Giannelli,
for example, has written extensively about West Virginia serologist Fred
Zain, whose corruption was revealed through DNA evidence. 9 Zain was
the subject of a major investigation and received coverage on the CBS
news program 48 Hours.10 More recently, public attention has focused
on the misconduct of prosecutor Michael Nifong in the Duke lacrosse
case." Nifong failed to reveal to the defense the results of exculpatory
DNA tests and instructed his expert witness to leave those exculpatory

5. See Paul C. Giannelli, Essay, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The
Needfor Independent Crime Laboratories,4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439, 442,447 (1997).
6. See In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab, Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d
501, 502-03 & n.2 (W. Va. 1993).

7. Id. at 503.
8. Professor Paul Giannelli and I have recently examined the ethical dimensions of
prosecutorial abuse of scientific evidence. See Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal,
Prosecutors,Ethics, and Expert Witnesses, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1493 (2007).
9. See Giannelli, supranote 5, at 442-49.
10. CBSNews.com, 48 Hours: Expert Witness, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/l1999/01/28/
48hours/main30458.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
11. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, ProsecutorBecomes Prosecuted,N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, at 4.
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results out2of his report. For these and other actions, Nifong has been
disbarred.1

I discuss in this Part a more low profile and in some ways more
troubling case than many of the wrongful conviction cases that have
13
received scholarly and media attention in recent years. Carrollv. State,
a Georgia case that has received little if any academic or media
attention, illustrates many of the features common to cases involving
prosecutorial use of corrupt scientific evidence.
Carroll was the nineteen-year-old driver of a car in which two
adults and a toddler were passengers. During a heavy rainstorm, Carroll
lost control of the car, which went off the road, turned over, and ejected
one of the passengers, who died. Another passenger was injured. Neither
alcohol nor drugs were involved. 14 Carroll was charged with vehicular
homicide and serious injury by vehicle, both felonies.1 5
The first "expert" witness used by the government to provide
scientific evidence in the form of accident reconstruction calculations
and conclusions turned out not in fact to have been an expert. He was the
police officer who investigated the accident scene and was taking, but
had yet to complete, his first class in accident reconstruction. Despite
lack of qualifications, he nonetheless concluded in a written
"information sheet" and in his testimony at the preliminary hearing in
the case, that the defendant's speed at the time of the accident was
seventy miles per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour zone. He also
16
concluded that road conditions "had no impact on the accident.'
To the investigating officer's credit, he showed his calculations to
the instructor for the accident reconstruction course in which he was
enrolled. His instructor, who was, in fact, an expert in accident
reconstruction with extensive training and experience, spotted an error in
the officer's calculations. Proper calculations based on the data the
officer recorded at the accident scene indicated a speed of forty-four
miles per hour rather than seventy miles per hour.
The investigating officer asked the instructor to serve as the expert
in Carroll's upcoming trial and the instructor agreed to do so. About a
week prior to the trial, the instructor visited the accident site and
12. N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm'n of the N.C.
State Bar July 31, 2007).
13. 474 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
14. Id.at 738.
15. Id.; see GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-394(2007).
16. Carroll,474 S.E.2d at 738.
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collected his own data about speed and road conditions. Having done so,
he contradicted both of the investigating officer's earlier conclusions.
First, he concluded that there was insufficient data to make any speed
calculation. Second, in the instructor's expert opinion, road conditions
had caused what he considered to be an accident rather than reckless
driving. The pavement was uneven, the road conditions had allowed
standing water to collect, and the shoulder of the road dropped off
creating a negative superelevation.
Six days before the trial date, both the investigating officer and the
instructor informed the prosecutor of the inaccuracies in the
investigating officer's information sheet and preliminary hearing
testimony. Though the prosecutor had revealed the prior speed
miscalculation, he did not reveal what the true expert, the instructor, had
concluded after his visit to the accident site.
On the day set for trial, Carroll pled guilty to both the vehicular
homicide and serious injury charges, apparently without independent
knowledge of her exact speed, the road conditions, or what caused her to
lose control of her car and relying on the investigating officer's
erroneous conclusions. The defendant appears not to have hired her own
expert. 17
At the guilty plea hearing, the prosecutor made no disclosure of the
existence or conclusions of the state's true expert.1 8 Nor did he disclose
(1) that the investigating officer, who had testified as the state's expert at
the preliminary hearing, was not in fact qualified as an expert; (2) that
his speed calculation lacked an adequate foundation; or (3) that his
conclusion about the role of road conditions was erroneous. At the guilty
plea hearing, defense counsel "stated that he expected the State's
evidence to show that Carroll was driving at approximately 44 mph."
The trial judge inquired of the prosecutor "whether that account
comported with the State's version," and "the prosecutor answered in the
affirmative."' 9 So, in addition to not revealing clearly material and
exculpatory evidence to the defense or the court, the prosecutor also lied
to the trial judge about the state's evidence in the case.
The proposed testimony of the state's true expert was eventually
revealed to the defendant, though the reported opinion does not state
how that was accomplished.2 ° Carroll then moved to withdraw her guilty
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 738-39.
Id.
at 739.
Id.at 740.
See id. at 738.
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plea on the basis of a violation of Brady v. Maryland.2 1 Remarkably,
rather than simply admitting the misconduct and apologizing to the court
and the defendant, the prosecutor's office resisted the motion, claiming
that the true expert's proposed testimony was neither material nor
exculpatory.22
The Georgia Court of Appeals took none of the prosecution's
arguments on appeal seriously and allowed Carroll to withdraw her
guilty plea. Although it clearly reached the right result on the merits of
Carroll's motion, the court's opinion sadly minimizes the prosecutor's
misconduct. For example, rather than calling the prosecutor's
"affirmative response" to the trial court's inquiry about whether the
state's evidence would show that Carroll was going forty-four miles per
hour at the time of the accident a misrepresentation, or simply a lie, that
violated the prosecutor's ethical obligations, the court only noted that the
prosecutor's response "did not promote
the truth-seeking function on
23
founded.,
is
process
judicial
the
which
The Carroll case exhibits a number of characteristics common to
cases involving prosecutorial use of corrupt scientific evidence. In these
cases, inadequate representation by defense counsel, often due to a lack
of resources to obtain a defense expert, allows and encourages police
and prosecutorial use of corrupt scientific evidence.24 Based on the
reported opinion in Carroll, it appears that Carroll's lawyer failed to
discover and expose the investigating officer's lack of expert
qualifications either through discovery or through cross-examination at
the preliminary hearing at which the officer testified to his accident
reconstruction conclusions. 25 Nor does it appear that defense counsel
hired an expert despite the crucial nature of accident reconstruction
evidence in the case.
Another common feature in criminal cases involving corrupt
science is culpability on the part of the prosecutor. In Carroll,the facts
recounted in the opinion suggest at least negligence on the part of the
prosecutor in using the investigating officer as an expert witness at the
preliminary hearing despite his lack of qualifications. The facts in the
opinion indicate a higher level of culpability-knowledge and
purpose--on the part of the prosecutor at the guilty plea hearing in
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.(citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
Id.at 739.
Id.at 740.
Giannelli, supra note 5, at 473-74, 478.
See Carroll,474 S.E.2d at 738.
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regard to failing to reveal exculpatory information, failing to correct
prior discovery and testimony the prosecutor knew to be erroneous, and
misrepresenting the state's evidence to both defense counsel and the trial
26

court.

A third common feature is escalation of commitment on the part of
the prosecution. Once the state has taken a position on somethingwhether the guilt of a defendant through a charging decision or the
testimony of a witness through a decision to call the witness-both
police and prosecutors display extraordinary resistance to changing that
position, even if later information reveals that the position is unsound.27
In Carroll, the appropriate course of action, once the true expert's
conclusions were known, would have been to dismiss the charges
against Carroll for lack of evidence. Instead, the prosecution proved
incapable of rethinking and altering its initial poorly informed position
that the evidence in the case warranted a criminal conviction. The
prosecution continued to maintain an embarrassingly indefensible
posture throughout not only the initial trial court proceedings resulting in
Carroll's conviction, but also throughout later trial and appellate
proceedings on Carroll's motion to withdraw her guilty plea, after the
28
exculpatory information was known to both the defense and the courts.
III.

WHY THIS BEHAVIOR?

Why do prosecutors engage in such misconduct? Why do they
negligently, recklessly, knowingly, or purposefully make use of corrupt
scientific evidence? The following sections address some possible
answers to these questions.
A.

Defense Counsel

In criminal cases involving corrupt scientific evidence, two features
stand out: (1) lack of aggressive cross-examination by defense counsel
26, Id. at 740.
27. See, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 2, 5-6 (1996) (The Supreme Court reversed a
conviction for murder when it was discovered that the prosecution misrepresented a pair of paintstained shorts as blood stained shorts. The prosecution was aware at the time of trial that the shorts
were stained with paint and not blood and "deliberately misrepresented the truth."); In re
Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab, Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 503-04 (W. Va.
1993) (report into the conduct of head serologist Zain shows that "scientifically inaccurate, invalid,
or false testimony or reports were given by Trooper Zain" and that his "supervisors may have
ignored or concealed complaints of his misconduct").
28. Carroll,474 S.E.2d at 739.
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of the prosecution's scientific experts and (2) lack of counterproof in the
form of tests and expert testimony offered by the defense. Highly visible
cases in which defendants with substantial resources have engaged in
extensive cross-examination of prosecution experts and offered their
own scientific counter-proof, such as the murder prosecution of 0. J.
Simpson, may create a perception that in criminal cases involving
scientific evidence both sides typically have ample resources regarding
scientific proof.2 9 But the everyday reality is in stark contrast to this
image. The more typical scenario is that whatever scientific evidence is
offered by the prosecution goes without significant challenge to its
accuracy either by defense counsel through cross-examination or by a
defense expert. 30 In other words, the mechanisms of cross-examination
and counter-proof, which the adversary system relies on to assure factual
accuracy, are strikingly absent in regard to scientific evidence in many
criminal cases, even ones that go to trial.
The reason for passivity on the part of the defense in response to
the prosecution's scientific evidence is not always apparent. One
possibility is that defense counsel think the scientific evidence
irrefutable and make a strategic choice not to challenge it. But the
literature that describes the unavailability to the typical defendant of the
resources needed to challenge scientific evidence offered by the
prosecution, offers a more plausible explanation. 31 Many defendants
simply do not have the money to hire their own experts to present
counter-proof or to provide defense counsel with the information and
assistance needed to effectively cross-examine a prosecution expert.
Most defense lawyers, without access to an expert, do not, on their own,
have the scientific knowledge needed to effectively cross-examine a
government expert. In many of the wrongful conviction cases in which
DNA testing has resulted in eventual exoneration, the defendant gained
access to adequate scientific expertise only during post-conviction
review, too late to help the initial fact finder, usually the trial jury, in

29. See Michael Lynch, The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson 'Dream
Team 'and the Sociology of Knowledge Machine, 28 SOC. STUD. OF SC. 829, 832, 854 (1998).
30. See Paul
CRIMINOLOGY 105,
31. See, e.g.,
Daubert, Post-DNA

C. Giannelli, "Junk Science": The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
118-19 (1993); supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a PostWorld, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1331-32 (2004).
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assessing the accuracy of the scientific evidence presented by the
government at trial.32
A system that allows prosecutors, police, and prosecution experts to
present scientific evidence without effective challenge, a system that is
adversarial in name and theory but non-adversarial in reality, is likely to
create habits and attitudes conducive to the abuse of scientific evidence.
By undermining incentives that help keep them honest in preparing for
trial, it creates for both prosecutors and government experts the
temptation and the opportunity to use corrupt scientific evidence.
B. Rational Calculation
One explanation advanced for why some prosecutors use corrupt
scientific evidence is simply that they want to win their cases. In other
words, the prosecutor's self-interest in winning may eclipse any sense of
obligation to the defendant, the court, or the criminal justice system,
typically thought to inhere in the prosecutor's role as a minister of
justice. The competitive urge to win no doubt explains much
prosecutorial misconduct. But that explanation, in my view, has its
limits. It fails to account for the fact that prosecutors operate at the
center of and subject to a constellation of varied incentives, many of
which should counterbalance the incentive to win. These presumably
include incentives to: (1) convict the person who committed the crime;
(2) avoid convicting an innocent person; (3) avoid wasting scarce
resources if a crime was not in fact committed; (4) avoid disciplinary or
other sanctions for misconduct; (5) avoid damage to the individual
prosecutor's professional reputation; and (6) avoid damage to the
reputation and integrity of the prosecutor's office.
Even if the prosecutor is simply concerned about her record of wins
and losses, she still would have a counter-incentive to avoid unreliable
evidence for the simple reason that if the unreliability is revealed at trial,
it may be devastating to the case and occur at a time when it is too late to
attempt to remedy it by developing other evidence, calling a more
reliable expert, offering a more attractive plea bargain, or dismissing the
case to avoid the embarrassment of losing the case at trial if the defense
succeeds at finding the weakness and revealing it to the jury. Perhaps the
prevalence of plea bargaining, along with the frequent lack of effective
32.

See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases, 33 ARiZ. ST.

L.J. 103, 108-110, 115 (2001) (noting various examples of defendants whose attorneys did not
challenge prosecution expert witnesses during the trial phase).
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challenge to scientific evidence from the defense, numbs some
prosecutors to the influence of such a counter-incentive.
During this conference on Lawyering on the Edge, a number of
speakers asked questions such as "Who would take that chance?" or
"What were they thinking?" in relation to a lawyer engaging in risky
conduct.33 One can ask these questions, for example, about the conduct
of prosecutor Michael Nifong in failing to reveal a DNA report in the
Duke lacrosse case. Certainly winning reelection by a largely AfricanAmerican constituency appears to have created a powerful corrupting
influence on Nifong's decisions in charging and prosecuting the
defendants in the Duke lacrosse case. 34 But even if oblivious to concerns
about innocence, no prosecutor engaging in rational calculation could
have concluded that the DNA evidence Nifong essentially hid would not
eventually be revealed in a case which had drawn so much publicity and
in which the defendants were represented by aggressive and well funded
defense counsel. One would also think that any rationally calculating
prosecutor in Nifong's position would have realized the negative
consequences that would follow the eventual revelation of the
exculpatory DNA. Wouldn't a rationally calculating prosecutor, even
one motivated only by self-interest, have abandoned, rather than
escalated, his commitment to a position he had to know would shortly
and publicly be revealed as both practically and morally untenable?
One response to the notion that disciplinary or other sanctions
create a counterweight to prosecutorial misconduct is that such sanctions
are very rarely imposed on prosecutors. In calculating the potential
power of sanctions, we commonly think in terms of both the severity of
the sanction and the certainty that the sanction will be imposed. It is a
common lament in the area of prosecutorial misconduct that prosecutors
are seldom sanctioned for misconduct and, when they are, the sanctions
tend not to be severe. 35 The disbarment of Michael Nifong 36 is highly
unusual, and the organized bar's past record of inaction regarding
prosecutorial misconduct gives good reason to doubt that the discipline
of Nifong will prove to be anything other than an aberration.

33. Symposium, Lawyering at the Edge: Unpopular Clients, Difficult Cases, Zealous
Advocates, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261-600 (2007).
34. William Yardley, Prosecutorin Duke Case Is Winner in Election, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2006, at A16.
35.

See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR

135-41 (2007).
36. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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I do not dismiss the sort of rational calculator explanations
discussed above. Certainly, desire to win, lack of effective challenge
from the defense, and lack of sanctions from courts and the bar play a
role in allowing and encouraging prosecutorial misuse of scientific
evidence. But I believe that we need to look further than rational
calculation to fully understand such misconduct. I find persuasive the
objection raised by John Steele in his talk to the question "What was the
lawyer thinking?", that it assumes a fact not in evidence, namely that the
lawyer was in fact thinking.37 In the sections below, I discuss some
possible explanations for prosecutorial misconduct other than rational
calculation.
C. Psychology
Psychology offers insight into professional dysfunction. In his
recent book, How Doctors Think, Jerome Groopman, a professor of
medicine at Harvard Medical School, describes the following analogy
offered by a pediatrician he interviewed:
Imagine watching a train go by. You are looking for one face in the
window. Car after car passes. If you become distracted or inattentive,
you risk missing the person. Or, if the train picks up too much 3spaeed,
the faces begin to blur and you can't see the one you are seeking.
Pediatricians see a steady flow of healthy children afflicted with
relatively minor ailments, such as a virus or strep throat. Because of the
high volume of such healthy children, it is easy for the pediatrician to
miss, like the face in a crowd on a passing train, the unusual child
suffering from meningitis. Groopman describes this as the threat of
being "lulled by the monotony of the mundane. 39
Prosecutors spend much of their time immersed in the mass
processing of guilty defendants. This processing relies on guilty pleas in
which little concern is shown for corroborating the accuracy of the selfcondemnation that underlies such pleas. The large number of people
processed by our criminal justice system itself creates pressures on
prosecutors to resolve cases quickly and with the least expenditure of
resources. Under such conditions, prosecutors run a risk similar to the
one Dr. Groopman describes facing pediatricians, of missing the

37. John Steele, Scandals Greatand Small, 36 HOFsTRA L. REV. 497 (2007).
38.

JEROME GROOPMAN, How DocToRs THINK 77 (2007).

39. Id. at 78.
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innocent defendant. Or, worse than simply missing the innocent
defendant, prosecutors may entirely stop looking for innocent defendants
among the guilty they confront each day. Guilty plea negotiations and
hearings in which little concern is expressed for assuring the accuracy of
convictions reinforce this danger of being lulled by the monotony of
processing so many guilty criminal defendants.
This "face in the passing train" phenomenon may help explain why
some prosecutors and police early on in the handling of a case
erroneously commit themselves to a belief in a defendant's guilt. Once
committed to such a belief, the well-documented psychological
phenomenon of escalation of commitment helps explain the
extraordinary reluctance prosecutors show toward changing that
position. 40
IV.

POSSIBLE REMEDIAL STEPS

What steps might remediate some of the problems described above?
The following paragraphs suggest some possibilities.
A.

The Needfor Information

Although wrongful conviction cases have revealed high rates of
both misuse of scientific evidence and prosecutorial misconduct, and
several commentators have addressed prosecutorial misuse of scientific
evidence, 4' we have little information about what percentage of
prosecutors actually use corrupt scientific evidence or what drives such
misconduct when it occurs. Bennett Gershman notes:
The prosecutor's misuse of scientific evidence to charge and convict
has not been sufficiently examined. Courts and commentators
critiquing abuses of scientific evidence in criminal cases rarely focus
on the prosecutor's role in the process. Issues typically discussed are
the questionable nature of the evidence, the controversial manner in
which the evidence was acquired and tested, whether the expert arrived
40.

See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 9

(1992).
41. See Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REv. 17, 17 (2003); Moriarty, supra note 4, at 23 ("To date, the legal system and
commentators have paid little attention to prosecutorial discretion in the use of unreliable expert
testimony---despite mounting evidence that misconvictions have been based upon unreliable expert
testimony."); Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys, 49
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421, 421 (2001) ("What are the legal and ethical responsibilities of attorneys
when offering scientific expert evidence to courts?").
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at her conclusions in a scientifically reliable manner, and whether the
expert's courtroom testimony was false or misleading. The
prosecutor's control over and manipulation of the scientific evidence to
shape the fact-finder's evaluation of the facts and to persuade
the fact42
finder of the defendant's guilt usually escapes scrutiny.
Consistent with Professor Gershman's description, there is little in
a reported case such as Carroll,described above, to help us understand
what influenced the prosecutor to act as he did in that case and how we
might prevent such behavior. In that regard, the Carroll case is typical.
And because professional discipline of prosecutors is rare, the
disciplinary process also has provided almost no insight into
prosecutorial misconduct generally or in regard to scientific evidence in
particular.
Investigation of prosecutorial involvement in the misuse of
scientific evidence would be an important first step toward
understanding and correcting such conduct. Such investigations might be
instigated and conducted by a number of different government offices or
organizations, such as the United States Department of Justice, a state
Attorney General's office, a state bar, a national district attorney's
association, or the American Bar Association.
B. ChangingProsecutorialConduct Standards
In theory, our criminal justice system relies primarily on an
adversary system to deal with bad scientific evidence. Each side is
envisioned aggressively challenging the opponent's scientific evidence
and presenting scientific evidence of its own, and the jury is trusted to
separate the good from the bad. In some cases, especially high profile
cases involving well-funded defendants, reality lives up to the theory.
But in many, perhaps most, criminal cases in which scientific evidence
is used, what takes place is a one sided presentation by the government.
If we continue to adhere to the adversarial model for the
presentation of scientific evidence in criminal trials, then perhaps the
most obvious remedial step is to assure that defense counsel have access
to adequate resources so that the reality of the criminal trial process
comes closer to its theoretical view of cross-examination and counterproof. Increasing funds available to appointed defense counsel would
help achieve this in cases involving indigent defendants. It would leave

42. Gershman, supra note 41, at 17.
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unremedied, though, cases involving private but poorly funded defense
counsel.
An alternative approach is to remove the adversarial pretense
surrounding presentation of scientific evidence at criminal trials and
openly acknowledge and accept the one sided system that in fact prevails
today in many cases. The adversarial guarantees of cross-examination
and counter-proof could be replaced by mechanisms to help assure the
reliability of such a one-sided system, such as having the court select the
scientific expert and having her report be available to both sides prior to
trial.
Another measure consistent with the recognition that the adversary
system does not function effectively in regard to scientific evidence in
criminal cases is altering current standards of prosecutorial conduct,
such as those found in ethics rules and under due process, to recognize a
gate-keeping function for prosecutors in regard to scientific evidence
similar to the one recognized in recent years for trial judges. 43 One way
to do this is to expand the types of culpability required for an ethics
violation beyond the knowing use of corrupt scientific evidence to
include reckless and negligent prosecutorial use of scientific evidence. 4
In short, rather than prohibiting only knowing use of false evidence, as
current standards do, both reckless and negligent use of corrupt scientific
evidence by a prosecutor would constitute both an ethics and a due
process violation.45
C. Audits
Another possible response to prosecutorial misuse of scientific
evidence would be to audit the files of particular prosecutors or
prosecutor offices in a fashion similar to audits conducted of crime
laboratories. Such audits could be done either randomly or in response to
instances or patterns of misconduct. They could be done voluntarily or
involuntarily, perhaps as part of a court imposed sanction for misconduct
involving discovery abuse or misuse of scientific evidence. The state

43. See Advisory Committee's Note to 2000 Amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702
("The amendment affirms the trial court's role as gatekeeper and provides some general standards
that the trial court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert testimony.").
44. For detailed treatment of possible expansion of the culpability triggering ethics and due
process violations, see Giannelli & McMunigal, supranote 8, and Moriarty, supra note 4, at 34-36.
45. I use recklessness and negligence here as those terms are defined by the Model Penal
Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (Official Draft 1962).
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Attorney General's office, the state bar, or the American Bar Association
might conduct the audits using teams of independent lawyers.
Such audits could provide a number of benefits. As a potential
sanction, they could deter some types of misconduct. If conducted
randomly, they would increase the chance of misconduct being
discovered and thus increase the certainty of sanction. Audits would also
provide information about how much prosecutorial misconduct is taking
place and what is driving the misconduct, especially if the lawyers
conducting the audit had authority not only to review case files, but also
to interview the prosecutor who engaged in the misconduct. If imposed
as a sanction in a case such as Carroll,an audit could function as a sort
of legal autopsy, giving us a window on the prosecutorial pathology
suggested by the appellate opinion in that case.
V. CONCLUSION
Advances in forensic science in recent decades, used by both
prosecutors and defense counsel, have made unquestionable
contributions to both accuracy and justice in criminal cases. At the same
time, though, a disturbing pattern of misuse of scientific evidence by
prosecutors and government experts has come to light. Though we
currently lack the data that systematic study of such misconduct would
provide, the number of cases showing such misconduct provide a
genuine cause for concern and should move us to study, understand, and
take measures such as those suggested in this Article to curb such abuse.
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